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MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION: TILTING THE LAW
TOWARDS A MORE COMPETITIVE ECONOMY
ELEANOR M. Fox*
The big antitrust case has earned the reputation of being unmanage-
able and untriable, a guzzler of scarce enforcement resources, a demoral-
izer of trial lawyers and litigating parties, and a blight on the credibility
of the litigation process.1 The need to address the causes of attenuation of
the complex antitrust case, and related concerns,2 led the President of the
United States to issue ExecutiVe Order 12022 establishing the National
Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures3 (National
Commission or Commission).
In essence, the President asked the Commission: What has gone wrong
with the big antitrust case, and what should be done to correct the fail-
ings? What procedural and substantive revisions are necessary or appro-
priate to avoid runaway antitrust litigation and to deal more effectively
* Professor of Law, New York University School of -Law; A.B. Vassar College 1956,
LL.B. New York University School of Law 1961; Member, National Commission for the Re-
view of Antitrust Laws and Procedures.
Portions of this article are borrowed from my articles, Proposed Monopoly Provision to
Reach Plainly Predatory Unilateral Conduct, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1979, 13, and In Defense of
the National Commission's Attempt-to-Monopolize Amendment, Nat'l L.J., May 14, 1979,
24; and from my Statement of Separate Views, NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF
ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESmENr AND THE ATrORNEY GENERAL 339
(Jan. 22, 1979) reprinted in 897 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 97.
' See NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REvIEw OF ANTITRuST LAws AND PROcEDURES, REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 11-14 (Jan. 22, 1979) [hereinafter cited as
COMMISSION REPORT], reprinted in 897 ANTTRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.)
at 3-4.
The government case against IBM is in its eleventh year.United States v. International
Bus. Mach. Corp., 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 17, 1969). The cereals case has passed
its seventh anniversary. In re Kellogg Corp., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 19,898, Dkt. 8883 (Complaint issued Apr. 26, 1972). The case against the major oil
firms has passed its sixth anniversary. In re Exxon Corp., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 20,388, Dkt. 8943 (Complaint announced July 17, 1973). The case against
AT&T is in its sixth year. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 74-1698 (D.D.C.,
filed Nov. 20, 1974).
The related concerns included a perceived need to make remedies in the complex anti-
trust case more effective, and to examine the desirability of the various exemptions from the
antitrust laws. See Exec. Order No. 12022, § 2(a)(1), (2), 3 C.F.R. 155, 156 (1977), amended
by Exec. Order No. 12052, 42 Fed. Reg. 15,133 (1978). The Executive Order as amended
appears in COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 319, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) (Special Supp.) at 92.
1 See note 2 supra. Among other things, the President charged the Commission to con-
sider "revision of procedural and substantive rules of law" to expedite antitrust litigation,
and in doing so, to reconsider the standards that govern attempts to monopolize under § 2 of
the Sherman Act. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 320, 897 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 92.
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and efficiently with the merits of the alleged violations, and relief if a
violation is found?
My fellow Commissioners and I heard testimony addressed to these
questions. Some who testified identified unbounded time as a major prob-
lem. They proposed that the trial judge actively manage the complex case
and set an early date for commencement of the trial. We agreed, and
adopted these recommendations.' Some who testified identified pressures
on lawyers as a major problem; pressures to leave no stone unturned;
pressures to strive towards endless complication and delay if delay bene-
fits one's client. We agreed, and recommended that ethical codes and dis-
ciplinary rules should recognize that lawyers have a duty to the adminis-
tration of justice to expedite, and that it is unethical to delay for the sake
of delay. We recommended harsher penalties against attorneys for willful,
dilatory practices. 5
It was apparent, however, that the core problems reflected by the unu-
sual duration of some of the most significant and visible antitrust cases
lay much deeper than judicial management and lawyers' tactics. Most of
these cases involve claims of monopolization and attempts to monopolize
in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.' We asked whether the state
of the substantive law of section 2 was a core problem and we heard testi-
mony, shared views, and debated the desirability of changes in the sub-
stantive law. We made recommendations for revision of the substantive
law.7
4 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 27-40, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 8-11.
SCOMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1 at 81-98, 897 ANrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 23-28. Bills pending in Congress would adopt some of the Commission's
recommendations. Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1979, S. 390, H.R. 4046-48
(96th Cong., 1st Sess.), 125 CONG. REc. 51345 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1979).
1 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Section 2 also prohibits combinations and conspiracies to mo-
nopolize, a provision not addressed in this article.
I It is not obvious that all of the problems of the big antitrust case will be solved by
active judicial management, judicially imposed time limits, greater sensitivity of lawyers to
their ethical obligations, and clarification or change of the substantive law. A strong case
can be made for measures giving parties to complex litigation a much stronger incentive to
expedite. Private plaintiffs already have an incentive - prospect of equitable relief and
financial gain, both of which come, if at all, only at the end of the case. However, govern-
ment attorneys, defendants' attorneys and defendants do not ordinarily have strong incen-
tives to make them end the litigation as quickly as possible. As for government attorneys,
the pressures and rewards must come from within the Department of Justice and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission. As for defendants, delay is now generally profitable; at least, it is
seldom unprofitable. The law could be changed to make delay costly and to reward speed.
One suggestion is to internalize the externalities: compute the costs of court, judge and jury
(which the government now subsidizes), and require the private parties, or the dilatory pri-
vate party if blame can be assessed, to pay these costs. Also, the law could deny a tax
deduction for litigation expenses, including attorneys fees. Finally, the law could require a
pass-through of certain profits (for example, profits exceeding the current commercial rate of
interest) derived during the course of the litigation from practices found to be illegal. If the
defendant in the big antitrust case has the financial incentive to expedite, there is hope that
even the big antitrust case will be tried expeditiously. See Testimony of E. Fox on H.R.
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Although our inquiry into the state of the law was triggered in part by
a procedural question, we did not recommend substantive change for the
sake of making trials shorter. Rather, we reviewed substantive law be-
cause our inquiry into the causes of attenuation led us to do so, and we
recommended substantive change because we considered change impor-
tant to the long-run health of the competition system. Procedural effi-
ciency would be a welcome by-product.
There was remarkable consensus among members of the Commission
on the direction substantive change should take. A significant majority
perceived that the law on monopoly and attempts to monopolize has been
moving away from principles central to a competition system; that it has
been moving toward toleration of a more rigid, less competitive and less
dynamic economy.' The purpose of thi's article is to articulate the salient
principles that influenced the Commission's substantive recommenda-
tions on monopoly and attempts to monopolize, to set forth the Commis-
sion's particular recommendations in these two areas, and to articulate
the underpinnings and applications of these recommendations.
Summary of Guiding Principles
In principle, the National Commission believed that competition, not
government regulation and not private monopoly power, should govern
markets. The Commissioners opposed protecting inefficient firms from
competition, and also opposed protecting monopoly firms from the incur-
sions of competition. The Commission expressed its commitment to free
enterprise and competitive markets for economic, social and political rea-
sons, stating:
These concepts [of competitive markets] are central to our
most basic social and political values. In addition to fostering con-
sumer welfare and allocative efficiency, competition is closely
linked to democratic principles of individual initiative, free asso-
ciation, and dispersion of economic power. They have been aptly
described by the Supreme Court as representing 'fundamental na-
tional economic policy' and a 'charter of economic freedom' of
constitutional dimensions. We believe these principles continue to
have overriding validity.9
Applying these concepts of competition to the problems of monopoly
and attempts to monopolize, the Commission made the following observa-
tions and recommendations. First, as to treatment of monopoly, the Com-
3271, 4046-50, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 1st Sess., at 108
(Sept. 27, 1979).
8 See COMLSSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 141-77, 897 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) (Special Supp.) at 40-49.
1 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1,at 177-78, 897 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 50. See also note 8 supra.
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mission perceived that the law as interpreted by a number of lower courts
has become indulgent towards monopoly. The Commission considered
that a system grounded in competition is and should be inhospitable to
monopoly. The Commission therefore recommended to Congress consider-
ation of a monopoly law explicitly providing for dissipation of substantial,
persistent monopoly power upon challenge by the government.'5 Second,
the Commission observed that the law as interpreted by a number of
lower courts has become indulgent towards single-firm exercises of market
power. Even acts threatening to produce monopoly have been condoned if
they appear to produce short-run static efficiencies. The National Com-
mission believed that a competitive system must be vigilant to prevent
attempts to monopolize and other uses of market power that chill or oth-
erwise impair competition. Accordingly it proposed modification of the at-
tempt-to-monopolize law to proscribe certairi single-firm acts, including
pricing strategies, that significantly threaten competition." This article
, The full text of the Commission recommendation in this regard is:
The appropriate Congressional committees should undertake an inquiry
aimed at strengthening the ability of the Sherman Act to deal with persistent mo-
nopoly power. Such an inquiry should be based on the following principles:
a. the chief goal of the Sherman Act monopolization provision is the dis-
sipation of persistent monopoly power;
b. persistent monopoly power can be presumed to be maintained through
deliberate conduct that would violate traditional Sherman Section 2
standards;
c. the current litigation process under Sherman Section 2 does not effec-
tively remedy persistent monopoly power, in part because the need to prove
culpable conduct leads to much evidence not relevant to the proof of mo-
nopoly power or the nature of effective relief and creates strong incentives
for the government to focus its resources on the liability stage of a monopo-
lization proceeding rather than relief;
d. the adoption of a standard enabling the government to obtain structural
relief on a showing of persistent monopoly power without the need to prove
culpable conduct would rationalize monopolization litigation in accordance
with the preceding principles, but would also raise the following issues,
which should be examined by Congress before any specific statutory change
is enacted:
1. the definition of monopoly power to be applied in using the
standard;
2. the type and scope of defenses to be permitted and the stage of
the litigation at which they should be permitted;
3. whether efficiency considerations should be permitted to affect
the availability of structural relief where anticompetitive conduct has
created or maintained the monopoly; and
4. the advisability of adopting a conduct-free liability standard in
view of possible disincentives to business growth or public percep-
tions of unfairness.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 141-42, 897 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Spe-
cial Supp.) at 40.
1 The Commission recommended:
The "dangerous probability of success" necessary to establish an attempt to mo-
nopolize under Section 2 of the Sherman Act should not be interpreted as requir-
ing proof of a high probability of actual monopoly, but rather a determination of
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discusses, first, the recommendations on monopoly, and second, the rec-
ommendations on attempts to monopolize.
I. MONOPOLY
Section 2 of the Sherman Act enjoins: No person "shall monopolize."' 2
Under current interpretations of this section, a firm with monopoly power
in a defined market runs afoul of section 2 of the Sherman Act if it has
achieved or maintained its monopoly power by "willfulness" or im-
permissable conduct, 3 rather than by superior skill, foresight and indus-
try." There is little or no consensus as to the meaning of "willfulness,"
and judicial definitions range from mere aggressive operation of the mono-
poly firm to illegal use of monopoly power.'5 If, however, a firm is found to
have willfully gained or maintained monopoly power and thus to have
monopolized in violation of section 2, it is relatively well settled law that
the monopoly power should be dissipated by mandatory injunction."6
This section will deal first with the relationship between the Executive
Order ' and the Commission's study of monopoly, and, second, with the
merits of the Commission's substantive proposal.
The Executive Order creating the National Commission directed it
to study and make recommendations, within the framework of existing
antitrust laws, regarding: "Revision of procedural and substantive rules
of law needed to expedite the resolution of complex antitrust cases and
development of proposals for making the remedies available in such cases
more effective .... '" Within this framework the Commission considered
whether substantive change in the monopoly law is desirable on the merits
and whether desirable substantive change is likely to expedite case
resolution and offer more effective remedies.
whether the defendant has significantly threatened competition. Such determina-
tion should be based on the weighing of various factors including the defendant's
intent, market power, and conduct. Additionally, evidence regarding the relation-
ship of price to marginal cost properly should be considered in assessing pricing
practices alleged to form the basis of an attempt, but proof that such prices were
below marginal cost should not be a prerequisite to proof of a violation. In order to
ensure uniform adoption of these standards, the Sherman Act should be amended
to incorporate them.
Commission Report, supra note 1, at 141, 897 ANrrrusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special
Supp.) at 40.
12 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
" "Willful" is used hereinafter to include both "bad intent" and "bad conduct."
" United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
" Compare United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431-32, (2d Cir.
1945), and Greyhound Comp. Corp. v. IBM Corp., 559 F.2d 488, 503-04 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978), with Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 915-19 (10th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); California Comp. Prod., Inc. v. IBM Corp., [1979-
1] TRADE CAs. (CCH) 1 62,713 at 77,975 (9th Cir. 1979); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274, 281 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3517 (1980).
, See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 250-52 (1968).
" Co missoN REPoRT, supra note 1, at 320, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 92.
1980]
54 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
The Commission's hearings on this issue opened with testimony by
John J. Flynn, Professor of Law at the University of Utah. Professor
Flynn testified that, in his view, monopoly status itself is an evil to be
remedied. He urged:
In my opinion, one of the most important substantive changes
the Commission can consider is the elimination of the conduct re-
quirement for proving monopolization in government cases. It is
no revelation to this Commission that several recent monopoliza-
tion cases have consumed and will continue to consume enormous
amounts of time and resources. My impression of several of these
and earlier cases is that upwards of one-third to one-half of the
cost and delay of those cases could be avoided - without compro-
mising the soundness of the results - by eliminating the conduct
requirement.'"
The Commission's attention thus was focused on the question: What is
or should be the heart of a monopoly violation? If monopoly status is an
evil to be remedied, the courts and the parties are trying a diversionary
issue - willfulness. If the plaintiff has the burden of proving a monopo-
list's willfulness, the discovery period and the trial itself will tend to be
far longer than that which would obtain if willfulness were ruled out as a
necessary component of the case.'9
Proof of willfulness does indeed tend to be a major burden of plaintiffs.
In monopoly cases, the plaintiffs' lawyers seek as much evidence as they
get of the defendant firm's evil intent and predation.- They search for
the proverbial smoking gun. If they have the financial resources, they
leave no stone unturned; the more "evilness" they can find, the more
likely they are to prove defendant's willfulness and thus to win the battle
of the facts. They search the record of defendant's history, conduct and
intent to show that defendant was impure and predatory and willed its
monopoly and its competitors' demise.
Monopoly-sized defendants may welcome this focus. The spotlight is
shifted from their monopoly status. They muster their forces to prove
their "goodness." The trial of willfulness provides the opportunity for in-
ordinate lapses of time, during which markets may change, personnel may
change, administrations may change, and both fervor and stamina for
prosecution may decline.
In the process millions of documents are exchanged;"0 thousands of
,1 Prepared Statement of Professor John J. Flynn to the Commission (July 1978), at 3.
The statement of and testimony by Professor Flynn to the Commission are cited at CoMMIs-
SION REPORT, supra note 1, at 171-74, 897 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special
Supp.) at 45-49.
" Contra, testimony before the Commission of Professor Robert H. Bork, Sept. 13, 1978.
In United States v. IBM, 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 17, 1969), pending in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 30 million pages of
documents were exchanged by the parties. COMMSSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 42, 897 AN-
TrrRusw & TRADE REG. REP.(BNA) (Special Supp.) at 12.
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depositions are taken; 1 and, at trial, tens of thousands of transcript pages
supporting each party's contentions are filled.22 When the parties rest, the
evidence of willfulness is typically ambiguous. The case is likely to turn
on the fact-finder's perception of whether the defendant was "bad," or
"bad enough."
At the end of the process, the judge and the teams of lawyers are likely
to be so exhausted that, if liability is found, relief becomes a tag-on issue,
addressed as a question of appropriate punishment rather than as a cen-
tral task to restore competition.
If "willfulness" is not a meaningful issue, then it is an expensive diver-
sion. It imposes enormous costs of time and money in the short run. It
threatens to impose the costs of monopoly in the long run, for the monop-
oly that is not proved predatory is validated, and the monopoly firm is
left free to continue to take its economic toll. If "willfulness" is a diver-
sionary issue, it should be eliminated as a necessary element of the plain-
tiff's case.
The Commission heard -testimony= and deliberated on whether persis-
tent monopoly power itself or only willful monopoly should offend the law.
After debate, the National Commission recommended that Congress
"should undertake an inquiry aimed at strengthening the ability of the
Sherman Act-to deal with persistent monopoly power." 4 Specifically, the
Commission recommended that Congress consider the desirability of pro-
viding for a government civil right of action to seek dissipation of monop-
oly power upon proof that the monopoly exists and persists.2 Willfulness
or bad conduct would not be a requisite part of the case." In so recom-
21 In United States v. IBM, 1,270 depositions were taken. Id. 897 ANmTRusT & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 12.
" As of the end of August 1979, the trial transcript'in United States v. IBM was nearly
100,000 pages long. More than 7,000 objections had been made to testimony and documents,
requiring a corresponding number of rulings on objections by the trial judge. I.B.M. Brief
Disputed By US. as Distorted, The New York Times, Aug. 28, 1979, D4, Col. 1, 2.
2 Professors Walter Adams, Phillip E. Areeda, John J. Flynn; Harvey J. Goldschmid,
Louis B. Schwartz, and Oliver E. Williamson are among those who testified in support of an
antimonopoly law. Professor Robert H. Bork was among those who testified against an an-
timonopoly law. Professor Thomas E. Kauper expressed deep concern that dissolution of a
monopoly might leave the market no better off and testified also that' conduct evidence will
be relevant'in proving market power and economies of scale. Commission Hearings, Sept. 13,
1978 and Oct. 17, 1978.
2 See note 10 supra.
25 Id. Dissenting views of Commissioners Hatch and Javits appear in the Appendix to
the CoMMssION REPoRT, supra note 1, at 349-55, 385-401, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) (Special Supp.) at 99-101, 109-15.
" The Commission's recommendation was limited in the following respects. First, the
Commission did not contemplate that the recommendation would supersede existing law
condemning anticompetitive conduct that produces or maintains monopoly. Second, the rec-
ommendation does not apply to natural monopoly. Third, the Commission did not address
the question of a private right of action against substantial, persistent monopoly. Fourth,
the recommendation calls for consideration of a civil right of action; criminality was not
contemplated and was thought undesirable.
Although recent interpretations of § 2 do not run in this direction, see note 15 supra, § 2
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mending, some Commissioners agreed with Professor Flynn that monop-
oly status itself is the evil to be remedied. Others believed that persistent
monopoly status presumptively reflects deliberate anticompetitive con-
duct. Some believed both propositions to be true.2 This author subscribes
to the first view; that is, monopoly status is undesirable.
The remainder of this section addresses the proposition, reflected in
the Commission's recommendation, that substantial, persistent monopoly
power should be dissipated in appropriate ways that are likely to increase
competition, efficiency and progressiveness.
Is Monopoly Undesirable?
"Hatred of monopoly is one of the oldest American political hab-
its. . . ."2 Monopoly is disliked for social, economic and political rea-
sons. The deep roots of distrust of monopoly are reflected in Senator Sher-
man's exhortation in 1890: "If we will not endure a king as a political
power we should not endure a king over the production, transportation
and sale of any of the necessaries of life. '2 9 Monopoly is antithetical not
only to general democratic goals of dispersion of power, but also to the
could be construed to reach structural monopoly. Decisional support for the Commission's
recommendation may be found in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,
427-32 (2d Cir. 1945), adopted in significant part in American Tob. Co. v. United States, 328
U.S. 781, 813-14 (1946); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); Borden Inc. [1976-79 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,490 (FTC 1978). See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193
U.S. 197, 339, 351 (1904). See also 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTrrRUsT LAw 615 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as AREEDA & TURNER].
The legislative history on point is not clear. Some portions support the view that the
Sherman Act was intended to prohibit monopoly, and others do not.
Senator Edmunds, who was the principal drafter of the bill that became the law, said in
the debates:
I am in favor, most earnestly in favor, of doing everything that the Constitu-
tion of the United States has given Congress power to do, to repress and break up
and destroy forever themonopolies. . .because in the long run, however seductive
they may appear in lowering prices to the consumer for the time being, all human
experience and all human philosophy have proved that they are destructive of the
public welfare and come to be tyrannies, grinding tyrannies ...
21 CONG. REC. 2726 (1850).
Congressman Fithian of Illinois reinforced the view that even the innocent monopoly
harms the consumer. Quoting a political economist, he said: "Whenever monopoly is domi-
nant, the incentive for improvement and skill is deadened. It is only when competitors con-
tend with each other for the favor of the consumer that they are stimulated to attract that
consumer by presenting him with wares both skillfully and cheaply made." 21 CONG. Rsc.
4102 (1890).
On the other hand, Sdnator Hoar assumed that anyone who "got the whole business
because nobody could do it as well as he could was not a monopolist...." 21 CONG. REc.
3151 (1890).
" See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 151-76, 897 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) (Special Supp.) at 45-50.
21 Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. Cm. L. REv. 221,
226 (1956).
21 Quoted in H. THoRELLi, THE FEDERAL ANTITRusT PoLIcY 180 (1955).
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consumer interest. It is for the latter reason that the antimonopoly princi-
ple enlists the support of microeconomists and others centrally concerned
with the efficient functioning of markets." This article deals, hereafter,
only with the economic case against monopoly.
The economic case against toleration of persistent monopoly status is
compelling. The monopoly firm has the power to, and will predictably,
limit production and increase price. The consumer is hurt by scarcity,
high price, and lack of alternatives. In addition, the monopolized market
suffers from the absence of the dynamic competitive forces that con-
stantly pressure firms in competitive markets to eliminate waste and to
provide better and cheaper alternatives.
As Professors Areeda and Turner cogently make the case against
monopoly:
The evils of monopoly are largely independent of the manner in
which it is achieved or maintained. Even innocently obtained mo-
nopoly can and likely will produce monopoly pricing ...
To condemn monopolization is necessarily to abhor monopoly
itself, the process of achieving it, or both. Chief Justice White and
later Judge Learned Hand thought that mere monopoly was itself
the object of statutory concern, although not necessarily unlawful
on that account.
3 1
Quoting Judge Learned Hand, Areeda and Turner state: "[T]here can
be no doubt that the vice of restrictive contracts and of monopoly is really
one, it is the denial to commerce of the supposed protection of
competition.
' -32
There is broad consensus, because of the acknowledged evils of monop-
oly, that the law should deter the creation of monopoly by prohibiting
attempts to monopolize, anticompetitive mergers, and various uses of lev-
erage. But if monopoly occurs in spite of laws that deter it, one must face
the harder question of whether and when to dissipate existing monopoly.
There is likewise broad consensus that if the monopoly was wrongfully
achieved or maintained, the courts can and should act to restore competi-
tion. The law so applied tends to deter anticompetitive acts. But where
the monopolist cannot be proved culpable, consensus breaks down. Some
express concern that dissipation of a "good" monopoly would be "unfair"
to the winner of the race; that an antimonopoly law not predicated on bad
acts will chill lawful competition by leading firms;- and that dislocation
dosts and efficiency loss that may attend relief against monopoly are likely
to outweigh the benefits of dissipation. It is argued'also that an antimono-
poly law is not needed because monopoly not supported by the govern-
ment does not exist. or is transient; and that such: a law is not wise be-
cause it will prompt enforcers to gerrymander markets for the sake of
See, e.g., 3"AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 26, at 615.
' Id. at 6i4 at 35; 615 at 36-37.
Id. at 37 (Footnote omitted).
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trustbusting, bringing down the good with the bad.
We come to the second central question: What are the costs of dis-
sipating monopoly, and will the benefits outweigh the costs. The question
may be addressed by dealing with the objections to dissipation.
Unfairness
It is strenuously argued that dissipation of a "good" monopoly is
simply unfair. Thus, a distinguished trial lawyer from Chicago, Fred H.
Bartlit, testified before the Commission:
I do not think we can emphasize too much the simple, funda-
mental reason for the conduct requirement. . . .And this has
been said again and again and again, but it deserves repetition. It
is not right to tell somebody to compete, to tell them to compete
fairly, and when they compete fairly and win, to penalize them for
it. This just is not sensible. And smart judges and smart legisla-
tors over a long period of time have felt comfortable with the
[conduct] rule that has evolved. When somebody competes fairly
and does a good job and does not push anybody around, then you
do not punish him for it. That is a common sense rule.?
Thus personifying the corporation and portraying it as a human being
punished for good works, Mr. Bartlit invoked the principle of fairness.
"Fairness," however, has more and different dimensions. "Fairness"
must take account of the right of the consuming public to be free from the
costs of monopoly, as well as the right to just rewards of those who in-
vested their money, time or talents in a firm that, "won" monopoly by
being better than everyone else. 4 Beyond this narrow inquiry, the appro-
priate question is not-whether the rewards are fair, but whether they are
sufficient to provide the incentive to competitors to strive to be excellent.
The scales of fairness would seem to tip in favor of protecting the con-
sumer against the costs of persistent monopoly. A law against persistent
monopoly gives rewards to the good performer while ultimately restoring
to the public the benefits of competition.
A law against persistent monopoly is no more unfair - as Professor
Turner pointed out some years ago - than the expiration of a patent after
17 years. 5 The law does not "turn" on the company that wins. Rather, it
assumes the company's enjoyment of monopoly profits or a quieter life for
substantial time. By the end of that time, market forces or, on their de-
fault, the law, should dissipate monopoly; the firm will have had a fair
Testimony before te Commission, Sept. 13, 1978, at 96-97.
' Those who make the argument of unfairness generally assume that the firm that has
reached monopoly status has done so either by predation or excellence. There are other al-
ternatives. Monopoly may be achieved by luck or market failure. See 0. WILLAMSON, MAR-
KEMS AND HIERARCHIES (1975). Also, it may be achieved by various mixes of these factors.
Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Regulatory Policies, 82 HARV. L. Rav. 1207,
1220 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Turner].
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reward. Consumer welfare should be respected.
Disincentives
One might worry about possible disincentive effects of the antimono-
poly principle. Will the near-monopoly firm pull its punches? Will it limit
production and raise price as it nears the monopoly line? To the extent
that a law undermines competitiveness or dampens incentives to do a bet-
ter job, it has undesirable properties that must be weighed.
In considering the deterrent effect of a change in law, the proper con-
cern is the incremental deterrent effect caused by the proposed change. It
is therefore important to take account of the fact that a deterrent against
activity that increases the market share of a near-monopolist is already
built into existing law. Judge Learned Hand's teaching in Alcoa gives
support to contentions that current law prohibits structural monopoly.'6
Moreover, there are acts, practices, and documents in nearly every mo-
nopoly-sized firm's past to which a potential plaintiff can credibly attri-
bute willfulness, and thus make culpability fair grounds for litigation
under current standards. The managers of the near-monopoly firm know
today that there is a line the passing of which creates concern about liti-
gation, damages and dissolution.
An antimonopoly law does increase the risk that monopoly will be dis-
sipated by legal' action if market forces fail to work. It could therefore
increase the chances that a firm may so act as to avoid monopoly. But
since monopoly, even if achieved, would be dissipated by litigation only if
the monopoly is persistent and market forces fail, it is unlikely that a firm
would withhold signiificant benefits to consumers only because of a change
in law to make it more inhospitable to monopoly.37
Further, the argument that an antimonopoly statute handicaps a near-
monopolist and deters competitive conduct by which it might achieve mo-
nopoly must be viewed in context. The goal endorsed is the best result for
the market in the long run, not the best result for the monopolist. Con-
straints on a firm that impede achievement of monopoly are not unam-
biguously bad. Constraints that limit opportunities for near-monopolists
may increase opportunities for non-monopolists by assuring them that the
See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); note 26
supra. But see note 15 supra.
1 If monopoly is newly achieved, the successful competitor may be less likely to expect
persistence and more likely to be a short-run profit-maximizer. If the monopoly should prove
persistent and impervious, it is unlikely that the monopoly firm would at some arbitrary
point begin to subdue its own competition to avoid dissipation. Professor Turner observed:
If apart from cases involving plainly questionable conduct, divesiture policy is
limited to substantial degrees of market power that have persisted for a considera-
ble period of time (thus indicating the unlikelihood that anything other than di-
rect action will provide a cure), it seems highly unlikely to me that any business
firm would subdue its competitive efforts because of the possibility that it would
be so successful for so long that divestiture would be applied.
Turner, supra note 35, at 1216.
19801
60 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
market is open and holds rewards for their good performance, and may
thereby increase and preserve competition in the long run. The possible
costs of deterring competitive behavior of a near-monopolist are likely to
be far outweighed by the benefits of deterring and eliminating monopoly.
The Costs of Relief
Will the economic costs of relief designed to dissipate monopoly be
outweighed by its benefits? There are two possible elements of the cost of
relief: long-term loss of efficiency (which would make the law counter-
productive) and short-term dislocation costs. Significant dislocation costs
would occur only in the case of restructuring. Such dislocation costs are
by definition short-term, and should be Acceptable if there are likely to be
significant long-run benefits of competition." As for long-term prospects,
monopoly should not be dissipated excelt by relief likely to help the mar-
ket operate more efficiently. The court should be able to devise such relief
in virtually all cases of persistent monopoly not involving natural monop-
oly or a potentially obsoleting product.
Divestiture of separate functional parts of a monopoly firm is a possi-
ble remedy. Indeed, it may be the most efficient way to restore effective
competition with relative speed. However, loss of significant firm efficien-
cies, where clearly threatened, would weigh heavily against divestiture.
Moreover, if market forces such as those created by new technology are
likely to dissipate the monopoly in the near term, divestiture may be an
unnecessary intrusion.
The court, at the relief stage, should consider not only divestiture; it
should consider various means of introducing dynamic competitive chal-
lenges. Especially where the monopoly firm is an outstanding performer
and an organic whole, courts should give careful thought to new and inno-
vative methods of introducing competition from outside sources, and to
issuing injunctions tending to break down barriers to entry and to effec-
tive competition." If an antimonopoly law is so applied, the costs of relief
should be insignificant as compared with its benefits.
As Professor Turner said:
As for the costs of restructuring, they might well be serious if there were any
extensive campaign of atomization. But we are not talking about that. What is at
issue is divestiture applied only to firms much larger than is necessary for econo-
mies of scale, and applied only if viable successor firms of efficient size can be
created. With these limitations, the disruptive effects of divestiture would have
short-run consequences only, and in my opinion the disruptive effects are usually
exaggerated anyway.
Turner, supra note 35, at 1216.
31 Possible judicial and legislative methods of dissipating monopoly power include: in-
junction against practices that have a tying or entrenching effect, compulsory licensing of
certain critical technology that persistently barricades competition, disclosure regarding
such critical technology, government funding of research and development by non-dominant
firms, tax benefits that encourage private funding of research and development efforts by
non-dominant firms, other government support of new competition against the monopoly
firm, and lowered tariffs.
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Transcience of Innocent Private Monopoly
Some who urge that predation should be a necessary element of the
monopoly case argue that substantial, persistent innocent monopoly vir-
tually never exists, and that therefore we should not bother to change or
clarify the law. This argument - which urges that the plaintiff should be
required to prove bad conduct because most monopolists are predatory -
misses the point. If monopoly is antithetical to a competition system,
then proof of persistent monopoly should make the case. To impose on the
plaintiff a burden that is irrelevant not only makes a charade of our legal
process but creates the very problem that gave birth to the National Com-
mission: the needlessly attenuated case.
Most monopolies not predatorily gained and not supported and rein-
forced by government license or regulations are probably transient." Nev-
ertheless, a sound law should be in place for private monopolies that
persist."
Fear of Abuse of an Anti-Monopoly Law
Some observers fear that a clear antimonopoly law would be the worst
of all possible worlds. Critics argue that the government will "poison the
well" at trial by introducing evidence of bad conduct (defeating attempts
at streamlining); that it will gerrymander markets to make every big firm
look like a monopolist; and that it will thus posture itself for a massive
break-up of big business.
This author does not share the permise that government antitrust en-
forcers are singleminded bureaucrats bent on trust-busting regardless of
the public interest. There is truth to the statement that an antimonopoly
law would not make all conduct evidence irrelevant. Nevertheless, there is
little merit to the argument that attempts to streamline will be defeated
in significant ways, or the argument that the government will gain and
use power to gerrymander markets.2
11 Government protection of patent monopolies, which serves the important goal of in-
ducing invention, is one way in which government intervention might facilitate or reinforce
monopoly power. The alleged monopoly firms that do exist in markets that are not natural
monopoly markets tend to be patent-intensive. Defendants IBM, Xerox and Eastman Kodak
fall within this category.
1' At the turn of the century, Judge (later Chief Justice) Taft remarked that the public
is entitled to the benefits of competition even in the short run. United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 284 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
Rejecting the argument that "outside competition would soon cure [the] abuses [of monop-
oly]," he said:
[This answer] would validate the most complete local monopoly of the present
day. It may be... that local monopolies cannot endure long, because their very
existence tempts outside capital into competition; but the public policy embodied
in the common law requires the discouragement of monopolies, however temporary
their existence may be. The public interest may suffer severely, while new compe-
tition is slowly developing.
Id.
"2 The court, not the government, determines relevant market. Therefore one should not
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Rather, a change in law focusing monopoly litigation on monopoly sta-
tus and its imperviousness to erosion by market forces should rationalize
the trial of a monopoly case. The first question will be, as it should be,
whether the defendant has monopoly power. Monopoly power presumes a
well-defined market within which the defendant can raise price without a
significant shift to substitutes. Of course the plaintiff, as always, will have
the burden to prove such a well-defined market. By dealing directly with
monopoly power, sound market definition will be encouraged and should
result. Procrustean beds tailored to fit the defendant should not be toler-
ated. A proper respect for market power is critical.
Under a stronger antimonopoly law, some but much less conduct evi-
dence would remain relevant. Evidence of recent conduct would be rele-
vant to demonstrate existence of monopoly power, for the effective use of
such power can prove its existence. Where conduct directly evidences ex-
isting power, it should be admitted. However, tailoring conduct evidence
to proof of market power, and eliminating incentives to prove a monopoly
firm "good" or "bad" in itself, should streamline both the discovery pro-
cess and the trial and should sharpen the analytical framework for proof
of the case.
Theory, practice, judicial administration, and above all a commitment
to free and dynamic competition and consumer welfare, support the con-
clusion that substantial, persistent monopoly power should be dissipated
by means designed to restore the efficient functioning of the market.
II. ATTEMPTS TO MONOPOLIZE
The President specifically asked the National Commission to reevalu-
ate the attempt-to-monopolize prohibition of section 2 of the Sherman
Act. The Executive Order directed the Commission to make recommenda-
tions for "simplification of the standards required to establish attempted
monopolization in suits brought by the United States under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act."43 The Commission's attention turned to two different
and quite significant problems relating to the attempt prohibition. First,
section 2 is the only provision of the Sherman Act dealing with single-firm
acts." Given strict constructionist interpretations of the attempt prohibi-
tion, there is an enormous gap in the Sherman Act that seems to leave
unrestrained substantial anticompetitive single-firm acts that threaten a
harmful result short of monopoly. 5 As a result, government challenges to
worry unduly about attempts of litigators on either side to convince the judge to gerryman-
der the market.
' COMMISSION REPoRr, supra note 1, at 320, 897 ANTrRusT & TRADE REG. RaP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 92.
" The Federal Trade Commission has broader power than the Department of Justice to
deal with anticompetitive single-firm acts. It enforces the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976), prohibits unfair
acts or practices.
41 See, e.g., Pennwalt Corp. v. Zenith Lab. Inc., [1979-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 62,749
(E.D. Mich. 1979). See also CoMIssION REPORT, supra note 1, at 144-49, 897 ANTITRUST &
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unambiguously predatory unilateral conduct have proved unsuccessful. 8
Second, a second gap has been developing in the law governing single-firm
conduct likely to produce or aggravate existing monopoly; namely, there
is movement toward immunizing all pricing strategies, even those having
both the purpose and effect of lessening competition, if the firm's prices
do not fall below its short-run marginal or average variable costs. 7 If the
attempt provision is construed so narrowly, most anticompetitive single-
firm acts would enjoy Sherman Act immunity; a result clearly at odds
with a pro-competition policy. Dealing with both problems, the Commis-
sion 8 proposed an amendment to the attempt provision of section 2."1
This proposed amendment takes the form of two provisos, which are ex-
plained below.
The first proviso reaches acts that significantly threaten competition.
In most jurisdictions, the attempt offense requires proof of two elements:
a specific intent to monopolize a relevant market, and a dangerous
probability of achieving monopoly. 0 The Commission's proposed two-part
amendment deals only with the "dangerous probability of monopoly" ele-
ment of the attempt offense. It does not suggest changing the traditional
"intent" requirement, and thus would not interfere with the well-inten-
tioned autonomy of firms. 1
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 41-44.
46 United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1122 (1977).
* See note 60-61 infra.
* Concerns or dissenting views were separately stated by Commissioners Hatch, Izard,
Javits and McClory. Commissioners Kennedy and Morgan concurred in general concerns
expressed by Commissioner Hatch, and Commissioner Wiggins expressed general agreement
with Commissioner Javits. See COMMSSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 331-414, 897 ANTrrRusT
& TRADE REG. RE. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 95-117.
"9 The amendment proposed would supplement existing § 2, adding to its language:
Provided that, in determining whether a person has attempted to monopolize a
part of a trade or commerce, (1) a dangerous risk of monopoly shall be held to
exist upon a showing that the conduct alleged to constitute the attempt signifi-
cantly threatens competition in any relevant market, as determined after an eval-
uation of the defendant's intent, the defendant's present or probable market
power, and the anticompetitive potential of the conduct undertaken; and (2) the
fact that a defendant's prices were not below either aveage variable cost or margi-
nal'cost shall not be controlling, but may properly be considered, in assessing the
defendant's intent and the conduct at issue.,
COMMISION REPORT, supra note 1, at 145-49, 897 AN'rrRUsT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Spe-
cial Supp.) at 50 (italics eliminated).
0 See COMMSSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 145-49, 897 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) (Special Supp.) at 42-44; Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. .375, 396 (1905). But
see Lessig V. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993
(1964) (minority rule; relevant market is not in issue and plaintiff need not establish
probability of actual monopolization).
31 Accordingly, the Commission's recommendation does not reach the single-firm acts of
a non-monopolist undertaken to realize efficiencies, even if the act happens to exclude com-
petitors and rigidify concentration.
A strong case can be made that proof of intent to harm competition should not be a
necessary element of the case where the challenged conduct, itself has a distinctly anticom-
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Under the Commission's proposed proviso (1), willfully anticompeti-
tive single-firm acts would be illegal if they "significantly threaten compe-
tition," whether or not they threaten monopoly as such." Defendant's
market power, defendant's intent, and the anticompetitive potential of
defendant's conduct all would be factors consulted in predicting the prob-
able impact of the conduct on competition5 The more egregious and
unambiguously anticompetitive the conduct, the more probable the viola-
tion. Likewise, the greater the market power of the defendant, the more
likely the violation.54 Bad intent itself would not constitute a. violation nor
would it convert competitive conduct into a violation. However, evidence
of defendant's intent tending to prove its strategy to eliminate or chill
competition, combined with evidence of defendant's power to do so, would
be evidence of probable adverse impact on competition. 5
Application of this proposed rule of reason may be illustrated by the
following example. IBM is one of a handful of manufacturers of general-
purpose computers. Several firms, including IBM and Telex, compete in
the related area of peripheral attachments to the IBM main frame com-
puter. If, each time Telex makes a better quality peripheral, IBM should
put the components of its peripheral attachments inside the main frame
and remove or change the peripheral connection; if it should do so to
stamp out Telex's competition and for no technological gain; and if this
strategy chills entry and stifles competition in price or quality, IBM
would offend the revised section 2. The offense would be complete
whether or not IBM-compatible peripherals is a separate market. It would
not be negated by proof that all peripherals comprise the relevant market
and that IBM could not -achieve monopoly in this broader market. 8 The
petitive effect.
52 Compare note 49 supra with Handler, Blake, Pitofsky & Goldschmid, Note on Preda-
tory Pricing and Attempt to Monopolize, in TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERiALS 181-87
(3d ed. Supp. 1979).
-" See note 49 supra. The defendant's market power, intent, and the anticompetitive
potential of its conduct have traditionally been factors used in measuring the reasonableness
of trade restraints. See, e.g., Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918);
United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 395 (1912). See also National Soc. of
Prof. Eng. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
" COMISSlON REPoRT, supra note 1, at 148-49, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 43.
Since threat to competition is the heart of the violation under the Commission's pro-
posal, a violation would never be predicated solely upon evil intent. An evil intent without
power to hurt competition would be no more of a violation after adoption of such an amend-
ment than before.
A claim of harm to competition by a well-intentioned non-monopolist that, for example,
charges long-term low prices because the firm is efficient, would not be an offense even if the
low prices threaten the existence of inefficient competitors, because: (1) the specific intent
element would be absent; and (2) long-term competitively low pricing is not an anticompeti-
tive act, it is conduct the competition system encourages.
Compare the facts in Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (D. Okla. 1973),




law would deal directly with a serious harm to competition, even though
short of threatened monopoly. As a by-product, the trial would not bog
down with a parade of witnesses and data tending to prove or disprove
that the market is IBM-compatible peripherals.
The recommended change to achieve this result would replace the re-
quirement of dangerous probability of monopoly with the lesser require-
ment that defendant's conduct "significantly threatens competition in
any relevant market."57 Thus, the main effect of the Commission's proviso
(1) is to catch willful anticompetitive single-firm acts that significantly
threaten competition even though they fall short of the brink of monop-
oly. The effect of the proviso is thus to close a loophole in the Sherman
Act.58
The second proviso addresses anticompetitive pricing strategy." Ques-
tions surrounding anticompetitive pricing strategy, which resulted in the
Commission's second proviso, stand on a different footing. A new, bright-
line rule on pricing behavior, proposed in a 1975 article by Professors
Areeda and Turner," now enjoys currency with many courts. Under this
" See note 49 supra.
" It is not clear that the gap in the Sherman Act was ever intended. In the Fifty-First
Congress the congressmen used the word "monopoly" in such context as to suggest that it
included "oligopoly" and "market power." See, e.g., 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (remarks of
Sen. Sherman); 21 CONG. Rsc. 2726 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds). The word "monop-
oly" became refined in its use over the years. As commonly used today, it refers to a single
firm with monopoly power. Accordingly, firms with market power but not monopoly power
may singly, or interdependently, engage in a broad range of acts that harm competition, and
they are able to do so with impunity. Cf., White Bag Co. v. International Paper Co., 579
F.2d 1384 (4th Cir. 1974) (dual distributors with less than near monopoly position can create
price and product squeezes on competitors without violation of the Sherman Act). Attempt-
ing to close this loophole in the 1960's, the Supreme Court reached out to find "contracts"
not central to restraints of trade simply for a jurisdictional base from which to condemn
anticompetitive acts that were essentially unilateral. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390
U.S. 145, 149 (1968); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 18 (1964). The Supreme Court
is not likely to take such liberties today.
" The Commission's recommendation on pricing was made in the context of attempts
to monopolize. The recommendation is, in theory, equally applicable to pricing strategies
that may offend the monopolization prohibition.
" Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. Rxv. 697 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Predatory Pricing].
11 After the Areeda and Turner article appeared in 1975, many courts began to immu-
nize all pricing strategies as long as the actor's prices did not fall below its short-run margi-
nal or average variable costs. See, e.g., California Comp. Prod. Inc. v. IBM Corp., [1979-1]
TRADE CAS. (CCH) 62,713 (9th Cir. 1979); Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
551 F.2d 790, 799 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); Janich Bros., Inc. v. Ameri-
can Dist. Co., 570 F.2d 848, 857-58 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); Hanson
v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977);
International Air. Indus. Inc. v. American Exel. Co., 517, F.2d 714, 724 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking,
461 F. Supp. 410, 418-19 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Crowley, 454 F. Supp.
847, 853-55 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Weber v. Wynne, 431 F. Supp. 1048, 1058-60 (D.N.J. 1977).
Where barriers to entry were high, however, plaintiffs were sometimes given the chance to
prevail if they proved that the defendant's prices were below its short-run profit-maximizing
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rule, pricing which does not fall below short-run marginal or average vari-
able cost"2 is likely to be held legal per se - i.e., totally beyond the reach
of the antitrust laws - even if used as part of a strategy to chill or de-
stroy competition. 3
price and the barriers were so high as to prevent other entry before the defendant could reap
the benefits of its market position. See, e.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp.,
458 F. Supp. 423, 431-33 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
Scholars have been less enthusiastic than the courts about the Areeda-Turner rule.
They have noted that the Areeda-Turner rule ignores strategic and long-run effects of domi-
nant-firm low pricing. See generally Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare
Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284. (1977); Williamson, Williamson on Predatory Pricing 1I, 88 YAz
L.J. 1183 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Predatory Pricing II]; Scherer, Predatory Pricing and
the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARv. L. REv. 869 (1976); Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of
Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1 (1979);
Ordover and Willig, The Economic Definition of Predation (unpublished manuscript 1980).
Scholars responding to Areeda and Turner have embraced analyses more attuned to the
dynamics of competition, to the strategies of the incumbent firms, and to the long-run
health of the competition process. For example, Williamson's approach is explicitly flexible
enough to condemn disciplinary pricing strategies. As Williamson observes: "Successful sig-
naling of a probably punitive response can permit a dominant firm to enjoy greater profits
(or an easier life) by reducing the likelihood that its markets will be subject to encroach-
ment." Predatory Pricing II, supra, at 1185.
In spite of the avalanching criticisms, and possibly because of apparent but illusory
simplicity, the courts have preferred Areeda and Turner. But see 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro
Corp., [1979-1] TADE CAS. (CCH) 62,720, at 78,040 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (predatory pricing
may be established by evidence of sales below total cost); Transamerica Comp. Co. v. BM
Corp., [1979-2] TRADE CAs. (CCH) 62,989, at 79,641 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (pricing below aver-
age total cost is a suspicious circumstance and is illegal if unreasonable). According to Judge
Schnacke in Transamerica, a relevant inquiry is whether the monopolist is "cutting losses or
cutting throats." Id.
12 Marginal cost is the addition to total cost resulting from production of an additional
unit of output. Variable costs are costs that vary with changes in output. Average variable
costs are the average variable costs per unit of output. Variable costs plus fixed costs equal
total cost. See Predatory Pricing, supra note 60, at 700-01. Areeda and Turner conclude that
marginal cost is the appropriate measure for determining the line between acceptable and
predatory behavior. However, since marginal cost is often difficult to ascertain and average
variable cost is more readily ascertainable, Areeda and Turner would use average variable
cost as an indicator of marginal cost. Id. at 716.
Marginal cost and variable costs by definition do not take into account any fixed costs.
Therefore, a price at marginal or average variable cost may be very low indeed, and may be
well below a level that, if persistently charged, would allow a firm to survive. Id. at 709. See
B. Bock, Innovation and the Economy as an Organized Structure 4 (Feb 13, 1980) (revised
paper for N.Y.S. Bar Antitrust Section Program)[hereinafter cited as Bock].
3 Predatory Pricing, supra note 60, at 733.
The Areeda-Turner rule came as something of a shock to the antitrust nervous system.
Antitrust had through the years been perceived and applied as an open, pluralistic, mul-
tivalued system that protected competition in markets, eased entry into markets, tended to
lessen extreme disparities in bargaining power, and tended to encourage independence of
traders. Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics and Politics: Reflections on Some Recent Rela-
tionships, 68 CAL. L. ?Ev. 1, 4 (1980). Courts, including the Supreme Court, sometimes uti-
lized economics. "But it [the Supreme Court] used economics to determine whether compe-
tition, as the Court conceived it, continued to thrive, not as a source for determining what
competition means." Id.
In the 1970's a shift occurred. Courts began to define competition in terms of efficiency.
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As one trial court observed, the Areeda-Turner rule protects monopo-
lies. A conclusive presumption of legality for pricing above marginal cost
"would truly be a 'defendant's paradise.' "6
Concerned with the narrowness of the Areeda-Turner rule and its ten-
dency to protect market power, the National Commission made a modest
recommendation: "(2) the fact that a defendant's prices were not below
either average variable cost or marginal cost shall not be controlling, but
may properly be considered, in assessing the defendant's intent and the
conduct at issue."65 Under the Commission's proviso (2), taken together
with proviso (1), pricing strategies would be judged by their probable ef-
fect on competition in the marketplace, not rigidly by the relationship of
defendant's price to its marginal cost.
Background and Critique of the Areeda-Turner Rule
Prior to the seminal Areeda-Turner article, the law on predatory pric-
ing focused principally on the intent of the alleged predator and the effect
on the victim. Pricing that was intended to hurt a rival and that did so
was for that reason likely to be held illegal.6 A problem emerged. Courts
were protecting competitors, not necessarily competition. These courts
may have protected inefficient competitors. Consumer interests may have
been threatened by depriving the public of the benefits of low prices.
Professors Areeda and Turner both. took the lead in identifying the
problem. They pointed out that intent to take from a rival all the busi-
ness one can get is entirely consistent with desirable procompetitive be-
havior. Intent to beat a rival by better performance is of no negative anti-
trust significance." Reacting to the state of the law, Professors Areeda and
Turner set about to create an environment conducive to rigorous price
competition. They may, however, have overreacted. The Areeda-Turner
rule swings the pendulum from the protection of inefficient competitors to
Areeda and Turner provided an economic rule of apparent simplicity, objectivity and preci-
sion, and the rule was at once embraced by the courts. See note 61 supra.
" Transamerica Comp. Co. v. IBM Corp., [1979-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 62,989 at 79,640
(N.D. Cal. 1979) (quoting Predatory Pricing II, supra note 47, at 305). Contra, Areeda &
Turner, Predatory Pricing: A Rejoinder, 88 YALE L.J. 1641 (1979).
" ComussioN REPORT, supra note 1, at 166, 897 AserrruusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 50. See Handler, Blake, Pitofsky & Goldschmid, Note on Enforcement of
Section 2 Since Grinnell, in TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERiMS (3d ed. Supp.), 24-31
(1979).
68 Most of the predatory pricing cases arose under the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13 (1976). See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702-03 (1967);
Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 118 (1954). In Sherman Act cases, predatory
pricing when it was found to exist, was ordinarily one piece of a complex mosai of anticom-
petitive acts. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 43 (1911); United
States v. American Tob. Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181-83 (1911).
1 Turner, The Scope of Attempt to Monopolize, 30 ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE Crry
OF NEW YORK RECORD 487 (1975); Predatory Pricing, supra note 60, at 704. See Borden, Inc.,
[1976-79 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,490 at 21,517-19 (FTC 1978) (Com-
missioner Pitofsky concurring).
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the protection of monopoly power.
The Areeda-Turner rule reveals the following premises. Economics
alone is the appropriate guide to antitrust policy, which should seek to
maximize efficeincy.6 5 Static microeconomics provides the tools to mea-
sure efficiency. Only the most efficient firms should enter and remain in
markets. Firms less efficient than their competitors should not survive;
society is better off if their owners invest their resources elsewhere."'
Reflecting these values, the Areeda-Turner rule has the ostensible
merit of simplicity" and the merit of hospitality to price competition in
the short run. However, it has the following limitations. It ignores long-
run welfare. Focusing narrowly on the relationship between a firm's prices
and its costs, and only in the short run, it ignores strategic pricing behav-
ior and strategic behavior of which pricing is only a part.71 As a result, it
condones conduct designed to have and having the effect of crippling ef-
fective competitors, raising barriers to entry and deterring aggressive com-
petition, and it thereby tends to preserve and enhance the long-run domi-
nance of the short-run price-cutter.
Approach of the Commission
A major contribution of the Commission is to highlight the limitations
of the Areeda-Turner rule and to reject the rulemaking approach Areeda
and Turner initiated. The National Commission does not embrace rigid
rules governing price behavior. It offers a framework rather than rules.
The framework allows for an open analysis in the tradition of antitrust.
6 See 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 26, at 289-390.
" Id. at 715a at 165. See Transamerica Comp. Co. v. IBM Corp., [1979-2] TRADE CAS.
(CCH) 62,989 at 79,639 n.68 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
71 See Bock, supra note 62, at 6. "The essence of competition, whether in a stable or a
more dynamic market, does not lie in the relation between cost and price, since what cost
means depenjs on the observer's method of viewing different and varying costs in different
time frames." Id.
71 As the Supreme Court has historically recognized, pricing behavior can be used as a
tool for the destruction of competition. In Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334
U.S. 110 (1948), the Supreme Court said "[Price-cutting] may be the instrument of monopoly
power to eliminate competitors or to bring them to their knees." Id. at 120. Many cases
evidence pricing strategies that thus debilitate competition. For example, in FTC v. Cement
Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948), several cement finns collectively used disciplinary pricing to
cause rivalrous firms to abandon their competitive pricing and succumb to the artificial basing
point system.
In more recent cases, defendants have prevailed despite disciplinary pricing strategies.
In United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1122 (197J), Empire pressured its competitors to raise their prices and to avoid soliciting its
customers. When aggressive competitors defied Empire's will, Empire used selectively low,
disciplinary pricing to bring them in line. In Telex v. IBM, 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla.
1973), Telex was aggressively competing in peripheral attachments and making products
superior to IBM's. IBM procured Telex's cost data and selectively cut its prices below
Telex's costs. Had it done so temporarily and with the purpose and effect of warning Telex
not to risk investment in the next generation of peripherals, it would have been using its
pricing strategy to dampen aggressive competition in the market.
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The Commission values both long-term low prices and real opportunity
for entry and survival of firms that can perform at levels satisfactory to
consumers. Properly applied, the Commission's principle would protect
neither dominance (as does the Areeda-Turner rule) nor inefficiency (as
did older case law). Instead, it would promote the long-run health, open-
ness and dynamism of the competition process itself.
The Commission gives these examples illustrating application of its
recommendation:
[W]here a firm with a dominant market position undertakes a
pattern of pricing behavior directed at excluding new* entrants
from a market in circumstances in which the firm could expect
such efforts to be successful, liability may be found even if the
prices charged were above marginal cost. Such pricing behavior
directed at existing competitors by a dominant firm in a market
with high entry barriers, for example, should be reachable under
Section 2. Similarly, when a firm undertakes a pattern of pricing
behavior intended to "police" competitors by discouraging price-
cutting, liability may be found in spite of prices above marginal
cost.,2
Below average-cost pricing would be presumptively reasonable if nec-
essary to liquidate excess, perishable, or obsolete merchandise; or if the
price cut is necessary to minimize losses in a shrinking market; or if the
industry is suffering from chronic excess of capacity.73 On the other hand,
if in a high-barrier market a monopoly firm with substantial brand loyalty
eliminates its premium to d~ive out an efficient, aggressive challenger, the
pricing strategy should be presumptively illegal. 4
Examples, like the facts of particular cases, can serve only as a guide.
Facts are infinitely variable. Rules cannot accomodate the dynamics of
competition. The important steps are to formulate goals and to construct
a framework for analysis based on those goals. The Commission took both
steps.
75
'2 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 150, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 44.
" See Transamerica Comp. Co. v. IBM Corp., [1979-21 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 62,989, at
79,641 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (citing scholarly works of Oliver Williamson and Richard Posner,
and citing Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977)).
71 See Borden, Inc., [1976-79 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,490 (FTC
1978) and the concurring opinion of Commissioner Pitofsky. Commissioner Pitofsky asks
whether pricing behavior is "unreasonably exclusionary" in light of the respondent's monop-
oly position. Id. at 21,522-24.
Even a monopoly firm should have the freedom of competitive response. The determina-
tion of what constitutes a reasonable competitive response is a question of fact. See id. The
question of fact should be resolved in light of the twin values of long-run low prices, and of
entry and survival of effective competitors, which in turn enhances the liklihood of long-run
low prices.
11 The case can be made for a simpler formulation than that offered by the Commission.
For example, Congress could add to § 2 of the Sherman Act a formulation already incorpo-
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Pricing and Efficiency
It may be argued that the Commission's approach is conducive to allo-
cative inefficiency. For example, if it costs Telex one hundred dollars
more per unit than it costs IBM to produce the same quality peripheral
attachment and Telex diverts sales from IBM, society "wastes" the extra
one hundred dollars' worth of resources used to make each Telex-pro-
duced peripheral diverted from IBM.
This is a narrow and incomplete view of efficiency. The possible
"waste" reflected by the extra resource costs of the diverted sales is likely
to be small when compared with the costs of an environment that deters
potentially efficient firms from entry and that deters entrants from mak-
ing the investments necessary for efficient performance." If antitrust prin-
ciples would encourage entry and survival of Telex and other competitors,
the competitive pressures from rivals may cause IBM to reduce a monop-
oly-level price on a long-run basis. In addition, the pressures of increased
competition may cause firms with market power to be generally more re-
sponsive to consumer demand. Moreover, if Telex and other challengers
no longer face prohibitive risks, they may make the investments necessary
to reach the low cost-levels of IBM, thereby tending to produce additional
efficiency gains. On the other hand, if IBM is permitted by law to pose a
constant threat to the survival of Telex (and others), and if it can with
impunity shoot Telex down following any significant competitive advance
by Telex, then IBM is likely either to eliminate Telex, along with its
procompetitive moderating pressure, or to deter Telex from making the
investment necessary to equal or outperform IBM, and to deter the entry
of other firms that would face similar prospects.
By supporting an environment hospitable to new competition in mo-
nopoly and near-monopoly markets, the Commission supports both dy-
namic competition and long-run efficiency.
Conclusion
In theory, the federal antitrust laws are pro-competition and an-
timonopoly. In practice, they are being narrowly applied in ways that pro-
rated into law abroad: "No person shall abuse a dominant position." See Treaty of Rome
(1957), Article 86 (European Economic Community); Act Against Restraint of Competition §
22 (1957, as amended 1965, 1973) (West Germany). See Markert, Developments in Interna-
tional Antitrust Law, 43 FORDHAM L. Rav. 697, 711 (1975) (discussion of West German anti-
trust policies).
Alternatively, an addendum to § 2 of the Sherman Act could read: "No person shall
abuse market power."
11 If, given an environment that encourages appropriate levels of investment, an infant
entrant is likely to become as cost efficient as a monopoly-sized incumbent, the efficiency
benefits of encouraging entry and survival are clear. Even if there is likely to be some perma-
nent cost disparity between the entrant and the incumbent, society will gain economically
by survival of the entrant as long as the benefits of its moderating effect are greater than the
costs of the additional resources used to make products that divert sales from the
incumbent.
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tect monopolies and harm competition. The balance should be tilted to-
wards a more competitive economy. The National Commission lends its
voice to this effort.

